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Background






• Bid protests are increasing
• Protests as a % of protest opportunities (i.e., awarded contract 
actions) increased from .16% in 2008 to .26% in 2016 
• Bid protests are effective
• Only 17% sustained, but an average of 42% of all protest cases 
were effective from 2009-2014 
• Bid protest increase transaction costs in:
• Prevention
• Adjudication
• Congressional and Executive actions to thwart protests:
• 1 May 2018, $350 filing fee to GAO (for EPDS)
• Temporarily banned prolific protestor – Latvian Connection
• DOD Pilot (‘19-’22):  LB (rev > $250M) protestors to pay legal 
fees if unsuccessful
• DOD’s Enhanced debriefings (> $100M, > $10M for SB) includes 
SSDD and follow-up questions
• Sponsored research (e.g., RAND)
Background
• Measures taken to avoid protests: 
(1) added layers of reviewers and legal counsel to scrutinize every document, 
(2) added procurement lead time, 
(3) additional discussions to allow offerors an opportunity to rectify 
weaknesses and deficiencies (technical leveling), 
(4) [unnecessarily] retaining offerors in the competitive range, 
(5) awarding more contracts than intended, 
(6) modifying existing contracts vs. new competitions, 
(7) shopping requirements to existing IDIQ contracts, 
(8) LPTA rather than full trade-off, 
(9) larger acquisition team, and 
(10) more extensive debriefings.  
Background
Purpose: 
• To better understand why bid protests are lodged by interested parties.
• identify meso-level decisions and actions of buy-side acquisition 
teams that affect the receipt of a bid protest.   
Research Questions:
1. What characteristics of a procurement affect whether a bid protest is 
received?
2. What acquisition strategy variables/decisions affect whether a bid 
protest is received?
3. What human factors contribute to receipt of a bid protest?
4. Are the pertinent theories surrounding inter-organizational exchange 
complete, and if not, what extensions should be considered?
Purpose & Research 
Questions
Model
• Backward stepwise logistic regression
• Unit of analysis = FAR Part 15 source selection 
• n = 240
• Original data collected via survey of USN contracting personnel
Methodology
Results
Independent Variables B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B)
Criticality .18 .09 4.58 .03 1.20
Service .89 .44 3.99 .05 2.43
Oral presentations -1.65 .85 3.76 .05 .19
Cost reimbursement contract .71 .41 2.92 .09 2.03
Protest fear .13 .04 12.99 .001 1.14
Protest experience .09 .05 3.98 .05 1.09
Sustained protest experience 1.16 .51 5.16 .02 3.19
Results
Type Count %
Intended to award without discussions 190 79
Inappropriate to award without discussions 92 38
Held discussions 143 60
Dissatisfied with discussions 43 18
Oral presentations used 20 8.3
Oral presentations appropriate 57 24
Oral presentations appropriate and not used 50 88
Small business set-aside 102 43
Protests 43 18
Inappropriate source selection method used 17 7
LPTA used but inappropriate 12 17
Awarded more contracts than intended 12 5
Results
 Average  Std Dev 
Min Max 
Team Members 10.3 4.3 3 21 
Transaction Costs $243,390 $300,415 $700 $3,551,944 
Transaction Costs/Contract Dollar $.066 $.203 $.00005 $1.77 
     
Document Revisions:     




3.20 6.67 0 99 
Evaluation Notices 13.94 98.63 0 1200 
Source Selection Plan 3.10 2.778 0 30 
Debriefing Scripts 2.43 3.56 0 27 
Technical Evaluations 5.55 9.07 0 99 
Past Performance Evaluations 4.22 8.65 0 99 
Cost/price Analysis 3.06 4.77 0 60 
Rating Charts 1.45 2.08 0 21 
Evaluation Briefing Charts 1.87 1.81 0 10 





Times per User 
Total Times 
Used – All 
Respondents 
Min Max 
Task/delivery order 43.5 2,308 0 300 
Sole source 14.2 624 0 100 
Modify existing contract 15.4 737 0 114 
 
Strategies to Avoid a Protest
• Since source selections for services lend themselves to protests, more caution 
should be exercised in their design and execution.
•Reconsider the part-time, ad hoc approach to staffing source selection 
efforts.
•(1) strategic sourcing, and 
•(2) mobile source selection centers of excellence. 
• Acquisition leaders should gauge the criticality of each requirement 
• Assign more resources such as PALT and experienced personnel
Managerial Implications
• Oral presentations appear to be underutilized 
• Appropriate for the situation in 57 (24%) of the source selections, they were 
only used in 7 of those (~12%).
• Explore ways to broaden their use. 
• Revisit the prudence of conducting oral presentations without discussions.
• Apply more personnel to source selections involving cost reimbursement 
contracts. Additional training should be provided for the most vulnerable actions 
mandated by cost reimbursement contracts, such as cost realism analysis.
• Listen to the contracting officer’s intuition as a gauge for protest propensity
• Source selection teams do not appear to be learning organizations.  
• LPTA source selection method is sometimes used to source requirements that 
are inappropriate to the buying situation.  Nevertheless, its use showed no 
statistical effect on mitigating protests.  
• Awarding more contracts than intended has also been mentioned as a strategy 
to avoid protests – no statistical effect on mitigating protests. 
Managerial Implications
• Confirms the deliberate use of acquisition vehicles in order to circumvent the 
more stringent, protest-prone FAR Part 15 source selections. 
• Be cognizant of effects on competition and SB
• Transaction costs of source selections is alarmingly high, averaging $243K 
each, or 6.6% of contract spend – higher than many surcharges
• Transaction costs did not reduce the odds of a protest.
Managerial Implications
• Shines light on an overlooked corner of justice theory – communications during 
relationship formation (i.e., source selection).  This is important; much of the 
precedent of relational norms are established during the interactions during 
supplier selection. 
• Oral presentations, in some way, thwart bid protests




• A better understanding of how oral presentations are conducted and 
whether such characteristics are meaningful in terms of contract 
outcomes and bid protests.
• Explore lack of learning from protest experience
• Is the procedural justice afforded by protests worth the high 
transaction costs of source selections.
• Any lingering impact of extreme or otherwise influential (in)justices in 
the past and how those (in)justices manifest themselves in future 
interactions, decisions, and behaviors.  
Limitations
• Response rate from original survey
• Variables available in the data set do not include all possible causes 
of a protest (e.g., errors)
• Only 43 protests (of 240) - unbalanced DV
Conclusion
